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ORIGINS OF THE SPECIAL LEGAL STATUS OF CAPITAL GAINS
I THE HARVEST TRADITION OF INCOME
The concept of income that has come down to us from the past took
its character from agriculture as practiced in the Temperate Zone.
In a predominantly agricultural economy, income appears to be a
physical fact and to consist of the annual harvest or its worth in
money. Capital too appears to be a physical fact: it is the land,
predominantly.
The formal concepts of income evolved by economists during the
eighteenth and most of the nineteenth centuries, though generalized
in form, were based squarely upon the nature of agricultural income.'
Income arises from purposeful economic activity, such as farming,
and recurs fairly regularly with the lapse of time, e.g., with the
passage of the seasons. It arises from a fixed and continuing source,
such as a farm or landed estate. Like the annual harvest, it is given
off by or separated from this fixed source and becomes available for
independent disposition or consumption without depleting the
source. Strongest of all these traditional earmarks of income is the
tendency to recur at more or less regular intervals.
Casual, sporadic, and unexpected gains, whether from the sale of
land, other property not ordinarily dealt in by the recipient, gifts,
or otherwise derived, did not fit into this concept of income. They
appeared to be the result of good luck, not the usual product of
purposeful activity. Lacking a continuing source, such as a farm
or business enterprise, they arose from discrete events. Hence they
could not reliably be expected to recur at regular intervals. A
prudent man, the conclusion was, will therefore regard them differ-
ently from ordinary income. He will treat them as additions to his
capital, not available for ordinary consumption. Capital gains in
this view included all unexpected receipts.
1SeeP. H. Wueller, Concepts of Taxable Income, a series of four articles in
the Political Science Quarterly, March, June, September, and December 1938.
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2 EARLY JUDICIAL CONCEPT OF INCOME DESIGNED FOR ENTAILED
AND TRUST ESTATES
The need for a legal concept of income first arose in connection with
the common practice of landowners in England and on the Conti-
nent of entailing their estates; that is, of limiting the inheritance of
an estate to a specified line of heirs so that the estate could not be
sold by any one of them or bequeathed at his pleasure. In effect,
each succeeding heir was entitled only to the income from the estate
during his lifetime, not to any part of the principal. The courts had
to distinguish between income and principal in the sense of what
could be rightfully consumed by the life-tenant as against what
belonged to the corpus or body of the estate.
The resulting legal concepts of capital and income were evolved
at a time when landed property comprised the bulk of all durable
property. The courts adopted the view that a man's capital or
estate, usually a farm or group of farms, was a physical entity, and
the income from it, its separable fruit or harvest. Increases in the
capital value of an entailed estate could not be regarded as income
of the life-tenant. What had been left to him was a life-interest in
specific pieces of physical property, not in a given capital value.
He did not have a right to sell any part of the estate and therefore
could not 'realize' a gain in value if it occurred. Hence there was
no useful sense in which appreciation in the value of the estate
could be considered income. For similar reasons, declines in value
did not reduce the income allotted to the life-tenant.
Where property was not entailed or transferred in trust, the
question whether a rise or fall in value, realized or unrealized, should
be regarded as an element of income was of small practical impor-
tance because of the general immobility of ownership and the
absence of income taxes.
Since the estates of the propertied classes in postfeudal Europe
were commonly entailed, a man's wealth was better measured by his
income than by the capital value of the property from which he
drew it. And the kind of income that was significant for this purpose
was the income that could be reasonably expected, the more or
less recurring income, not unforeseen, sporadic gains. Hence in
England and in Europe generally it became traditional to measure a
man's economic position by the amount of his recurring annual
income, not by the principal amount of his estate. 'Smith is worth
£5,000 a year' illustrates the type of measure of wealth that persists
in England to this day.ORIGINS OF SPECIAL LEGAL STATUS 27
3 THE PHYSICAL CONCEPT OF INVESTMENT APPLIED TO SECURITIES
When securities and saleable real estate came to constitute large
parts of trust estates, the courts had to choose between assigning to
the life-tenant as income or to the remainderman as principal the
profits realized on sales of assets. Had it been common to think of
capital or principal as a pecuniary quantity, the estate to be safe-
guarded might have been conceived as consisting of a given capital
value, with all additions being viewed as income available for con-
sumption. Even unrealized changes in the market value of the items
comprising the estate might conceivably have been taken into
account in arriving at the income available for the holder of a life-
interest.
But this, we have seen, was not the case. The dominant position
long held by landed property had fostered the concept of capital
as a physical thing. As against the fairly elaborate accounting prac-
tices needed to administer a pecuniary or quantitative concept of
capital, most owners of property until a century or so ago kept only
primitive and scanty financial accounts. Although government bonds
and some other securities were bought and sold to a limited extent
through stockbrokers long before the organization of the London
Stock Exchange in 1773, they were only a tiny and unrepresentative
fraction of accumulated private wealth. For most capital assets,
primarily landed properties, ready markets did not exist and sales
were infrequent.
In these circumstances it is not surprising that, instead of regard-
ing securities as quantities of pecuniary value, measured by cost
or market price, the courts applied the same physical concept of
capital or principal that they had long applied in the administration
of landed estates.2 A government bond in which the purchaser had
invested £1,000 was regarded as a res, a thing. The capital invest-
ment was not the quantity of money that had been paid for the bond
or its market value, but the bond itself. Hence a rise or fall in the
value of the bond did not change the investment and was not an
element of income. If gains were realized on the sale, they were
regarded as nonincome 'accretions to capital' in much the same
way as an accretion was said to take place to a piece of land when,
in the course of time, a water boundary receded. Since the capital
investment was regarded as a thing, not a pecuniary quantity, the
'See Nathan Isaacs, Principal —Quantumor Res, 46 Harvard Law Review,
776 if. (1933); Roswell Magill, Taxable Income (Ronald Press, rev. ed.
1945), p. 29, 40-2.28 CHAPTER 2
'maintenance of capital' did not require the maintenance of its value.
The entire receipts from interest payments constituted income even
if the value of the bond fell below its cost and it was sold at a loss.
The retention of the res concept of capital in the administration of
various trust estates, despite a clear recognition of its alternative,
was emphasized by an American court in 1927 (Hayes v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 1043, 298 S. W. 91, 97): "What
is the principal or corpus of the estate in cases of this kind? Is it
the corporate stock, itself, or its value at a given time? Undoubtedly
the former. If the trust estate were land, the fact would be clear."
By dint of long usage the concept of a capital investment as a res
or thing and the correlative view that a rise or fall in its value,
realized or unrealized, is not relevant for determining income be-
came thoroughly embedded in the law and traditions of England
and various other countries. When the use of incomes as a base for
taxes was gradually introduced into Great Britain and Europe,
mainly during the 19th century, taxable income was commonly
limited to the yields from specific continuing sources. The early
European income taxes were not levied upon the total incomes of
persons, but upon the net yields of various sources of income, the
rates often varying with the source. Net yield taxes of this type,
though now usually supplemented by general personal income taxes,
are still levied in most European countries.
When Great Britain inaugurated income taxation in 1798 and
when she adopted her present income tax system in 1842, the form
of the tax was that of a levy on the yields from stated sources, but
the effect was that of a personal income tax because the same rates
were applied to incomes from all sources and because nearly all
kinds of income were covered. Consistent with the res concept of
an investment, though doubtless for other reasons as well, capital
gains were excluded. By long tradition capital gains were not
regarded as ordinary income, and the British early adopted, and still
retain, the principle that taxable income is to be determined by the
practices of the business community when these do not conflict with
express provisions of the law.3
Before World War I British practice also excluded from income
tax the profits from isolated or infrequent transactions. This exclu-
sion was in keeping with the agricultural tradition that confined the
concept of income to regularly recurring receipts. It appeared to be
in keeping, too, with the wording of the law, which applied to
$SeeGeorge 0. May, Financial Accounting (Macmillan, 1943), Ch. IV.ORIGINS OF SPECIAL LEGAL STATUS 29
'annual' income. The British Revenue Act does not expressly define
income as such and does not cover all forms of income. It applies
only to the types described in 5 'schedules.' Schedules A, B, C, and
E deal with income from specified sources, such as the rental value
of lands and buildings, and interest on government bonds. Schedule
D applies to "the annual profits or gains arising...fromany kind
of property whatever...fromany trade, profession, employment
or vocation," to interest annuities, "and other annual profits or
gains not charged under Schedule A, B, C, or E, and not specially
exempted from tax. .. ." Theword 'annual' had long been interpreted
to exclude occasional isolated profits.Opportunities to make
sporadic, nonrecurring gains were exceptionally abundant during
and immediately after World War I, and much indignation was
aroused by the fact that such profits were escaping taxation.4 The
Royal Commission on the Income Tax (Par. 91) was "of the opinion
that any profit made on a transaction recognizable as a business
transaction, i.e., a transaction in which the subject matter was
acquired with a view to profit-seeking, should be brought within
the scope of the income tax, and should not be treated as an accretion
of capital simply because the transaction lies outside the range of
the taxpayer's ordinary business, or because the opportunities of
making such profits are not likely, in the nature of things, to occur
regularly at short intervals."
But the Commission distinguished such profits from those realized
by "ordinary changes of investments" (Par. 90): "Profits that arise
from ordinary changes of investments should normally remain
outside the scope of the tax but they should nevertheless be charged
if and when they constitute a regular source of profit."
The Commission's recommendations were not formally embodied
in law. Instead, the Board of Inland Revenue made a vigorous and
successful effort to reach the profits from single ventures of an
obviously trading nature and those from a series of transactions,
each of which separately would not have constituted the carrying on
of a trade.5
4 AMERICAN CONDITIONS DIFFERED
While the economy of the United States was predominantly agricul-
tural in its early years, realized capital gains quickly took on a more
'See George 0. May, The British Treatment of Capital Gains, Journal of
Accountancy, June 1942.
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conspicuous role than they had abroad. Land was so plentiful and
cheap that its ownership did not carry the social prestige it did
abroad. The strong desire to keep the descent of land ownership
along family lines, so conspicuous in Europe, was relatively weak
here. The purchase and sale of land and the accumulation of
private fortunes through the profits from such transactions became
common early in our history. On the other hand, long established
and stable incomes from land rents and bond interest were rare.
Later, the quick succession of economic changes created by the
rapid growth of population and the discovery and exploitation of
natural resources produced frequent large increases in the market
values of countless business enterprises and pieces of real estate.
By reason of a high degree of mobility of business men and their
capital, a considerable part of such value increases was converted
into realized gains.
In many transactions gains from sales of capital assets consti-
tuted the major type of profit contemplated. With little regard for
the niceties of accrual accounting, profits were commonly sought
and calculated on the basis of specific transactions. Opportunities
for capital gains were in fact recurring. It became not uncommon
for some business men to meet a part or even all of their consump-
tion requirements from capital gains. In some sections of the country
farmers acquired the reputation of buying their farms with one eye
on the income to be obtained from farming and the other on the
trend of land values.
In this environment capital gains became scarcely distinguish-
able from ordinary business profits for many business men and a
familiar source of private wealth. At the same time, unlike the situ-
ation in England, the value of a man's principal or capital, rather
than the income he derived from it, was generally adopted as the
measure• of his wealth. For these reasons the sharp distinction
between ordinary income and capital gains that still prevails in
England never obtained as strong a hold in the United States.
5AMERICANJURISPRUDENCE INHERITED THE BRITISH CONCEPTS
BUT WAS GOVERNED BY DIFFERENT STATUTES
American jurisprudence inherited from the British common law
the tendency to regard a capital investment as a thing, rather than as
a quantity of pecuniary value equal to the original cost or market
value. But when Congress expressly included the gains from capital
assets in taxable income, the Supreme Court did not find this uncon-ORIGINS OF SPECIAL LEGAL STATUS 31
stitutional. The Court did, however, establish the requirement that,
to be taxable as income, the gains must be 'realized.' And in ruling
on the earmarks of realization, it has tended to apply the resas
against the value concept of capital investment.
The Revenue Act of 1862, the first tax measure of the Civil War
period to become effective, introduced an income tax "upon the
annual gains, profits, or income of every person residing in the
United States, whether derived from any kind of property, rents,
interest, dividends, salaries, or from any profession, trade, employ-
ment, or vocation carried on in the United States or elsewhere, or
from any other source whatever, except as hereinafter mentioned,
if such annual gains, profits, or income exceed the sum of six
hundred dollars. "6Neitherthe Act nor the regulations referred
specifically to capital gains and losses, though the language of the
form for reporting the tax appeared to be broad enough to include
them.7 That profits on sales of real estate were taxable is known
from the objections raised in Congress during the discussion of the
Revenue Act of 1864 to a ruling of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue that profits from real estate were income in the year of
sale even though they had accrued over a long period.8 The 1864
Act altered this treatment by providing that gains and losses from
sales of real estate should be taken into account in determining
taxable income only when realized from property that had been
acquired within the preceding year, but expressly included in "the
annual gains, profits, or income" to be taxed "all income or gains
derived from the purchase and sale of stocks or other property,
real or personal..
.In1867 the law was amended (14 Stat. L.
471-87) by dropping the word 'annual' from the general definition
of "the gains, profits or income" to be taxed; by omitting the clause
quoted in the preceding sentence under which gains from the pur-
chase and sale of stocks or other property were specifically included;
and by including gains from real estate acquired during the pre-
ceding two years.
3The firstactpassed, that of 1861, never went into effect. Revenue Act ot
1862, Sec. 89, Public No. 97, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., Ch. 119, 12 statutes.
For a copy of the income tax regulations and an outline of the form for
reporting, see C. F. Estee, The Excise Tax Law (Fitch, Estee, and Co., New
York, 1863).
SS. Seidman, Legislative History of the Federal Income Tax Laws, 1861-
1938 (Prentice-Hall, 1938), P. 1028, cites to this effect the Congressional
Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2516.
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In a famous case interpreting the Civil War Income Tax Act of
1867 —Grayv. Darlington, decided in 1872 (15 Wall. 63) —the
Supreme Court declared that profits of $20,000 realized by an
investor in 1869 on the sale of United States government bonds he
had owned for four years were not taxable as income.
"The statute looks, with some exceptions, for subjects of taxa-
tion only to annual gains, profits, and income. Its general language
is 'that there shall be levied, collected, and paid annually upon the
gains, profits, and income of every person....' Thislanguage has
only one meaning, and that is that the assessment, collection, and
payment prescribed are to be made upon the annual products or
income of one's property or labor, or such gains or profits as may
be realized from a business transaction begun and completed during
the preceding year. There are exceptions, as already intimated, to
the general rule of assessment thus prescribed. One of these general
exceptions is expressed in the statute and relates to profits upon
sales of real property, requiring, in the estimation of gains, the
profits of such sales to be included where the property has been
purchased, not only within the preceding year, but within the two
preceding years.... Except,however, in these and similar cases,
and in cases of sales of real property, the statute only applies to
such gains, profits, and income as are strictly acquisitions made
during the year preceding that in which the assessment is levied
and collected.
The mere fact that the property has advanced in value between
the date of its acquisition and sale does not authorize the imposition
of the tax on the amount of the advance. Mere advance in value in
no sense constitutes the gains, profits, or income specified by the
statute. It constitutes and can be treated merely as increase of
capital.
The rule adopted by the officers of the revenue in the present
case would justify them in treating as gains of one year the increase
in the value of property extending through any number of years,
through even the entire century. The actual advance in value of
property over its cost may, in fact, reach its height years before
its sale; the value of the property may, in truth, be less at the time
of the sale than at any previous period in ten years, yet, if the
amount received exceed the actual cost of the property, the excess
is to be treated, according to their views, as gains of the owner for
the year in which the sale takes place. We are satisfied that no such
result was intended by the statute."ORIGINS OF SPECIAL LEGAL STATUS 33
Although some of the language of the opinion, particularly in the
second of the three paragraphs reproduced above, reflects the tra-
ditional British distinction between income and an accretion to cap-
ital, the actual decision appears to have been based squarely upon
the wording of the statute.1° Except for gains from real estate
acquired within 2 years, the statute was interpreted to apply only to
annual or recurring gains. It is noteworthy that the Court did not
condemn the inclusion of the specified real estate gains in taxable
income.
The Revenue Act of 1870 (16 Stat. L., 256-62), nearly identical
with that of 1867 in its definition of income, was the last of the
Civil War income tax laws. After it expired in 1873, Congress did
not reimpose an income tax until 1894, when it enacted a measure
(28 Stat. L., 553-69) under which taxable income was defined, in
part, as in the 1867 Act, as "the gains, profits, and income
whether said gains, profits, or income be derived from any kind of
property, rents, interest, dividends, or salaries...orfrom any
source whatever." Gains from the sale of real estate acquired within
2 years and the money value of gifts and inheritances were specifi-
cally included. But the Supreme Court, by a five to four decision
in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, held the Act
unconstitutional on the ground that the tax was a direct tax which
could be valid only if apportioned among the states in proportion to
population.1'
Fourteen years later Congress accommodated itself to this deci-
sion, as far as a tax on corporation incomes was concerned, by
enacting the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 (36 Stat. L.,
13-8) under which the tax was nominally imposed for the privilege
of doing business in corporate form, but the amount of the tax was
measured by 1 percent of the net income in excess of $5,000. This
law was found constitutional.'2 In a leading decision interpreting it,
the Supreme Court enunciated a definition of taxable income that
it subsequently repeated many times: "Income may be defined as
the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined."3
In three other decisions under the 1909 Act, all handed down
Magill,op.cit., pp. 103-4.
157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673 (1895); on rehearing 158U.S. 601, 15 Sup.
Ct.912 (1895).
Flint v. Stone-Tracy Company, 220U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1911).
"Stratton'sIndependence, Ltd. v. 231ITS 34 Sup. Ct.136
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on the same day in 1918, the Supreme Court upheld the inclusion
in taxable income of realized gains derived from the appreciation
of property values. In Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Company, in
which a lumber dealer contended that the proceeds of its sales
largely represented a rise in the value of its capital assets, not a
taxable gain, the Court said:'4.
"The suggestion that the entire proceeds of the conversion should
be still treated as the same capital, changed only in form and con-
taining no element of income although including an increment of
value, we reject at once as inconsistent with the general purpose of
the act. Selling for profit is too familiar a business transaction to
permit us to suppose that it was intended to be omitted from con-
sideration in an act for taxing the doing of business in corporate
form upon the basis of the income received 'from all sources'.
In order to determine whether there has been gain or loss,
and the amount of the gain, if any, we must withdraw from the gross
proceeds an amount sufficient to restore the capital value that
existed at the commencement of the period under consideration."
In Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Company, the defendant com-
pany had realized a gain of $210,000 in 1911 on the sale of stock
in another company acquired nine years bef ore.15 The Court held
that the excess of the sales price over the value on December 31,
1908, constituted a taxable profit, and a decision to the same effect
was rendered in U. S. v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co.'6
6 STATUTORY PROVISION FOR TAXING REALIZED CAPITAL GAINS
AS INCOME UNDER THE 16TH AMENDMENT SQUARELY UPHELD
The 16th Amendment to the Constitution was ratified on February
25, 1913. The present-day series of income tax laws begins with
the first Act passed under it, that approved on October 3, 1913,
effective as of March 1, 1913 (38 Stat. 166). Net income was
defined in the following paragraph, the substance of which has been
repeated in the subsequent Acts:
"That, subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are
hereinafter allowed, the net income of a taxable person shall include
gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compen-
sation, or personal service of whatever kind and in whatever form
paid, or from professions, vocations, businesses, trade, commerce, or
sales, or dealings in property whether real or personal, growing out
"247 U. S. 179, 38 Sup.Ct. 467 (1918).
247 U. S. 189,38 Sup. Ct. 470 (1918).
U.S.195,38 Sup. Ct. 472 (1918).ORIGINS OF SPECIAL LEGAL STATUS 35
of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal property,
also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of
any lawful business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits,
and income derived from any source whatever."
In a series of notable decisions in 1920 and 1921 the Supreme
Court crystallized its interpretation that the word 'income' includes
capital gains. In Eisner v. Macomber, Justice Pitney, speaking for
the majority, declared:'7
"For the present purpose, we require only a clear definition of
the term 'income' as used in common speech, in order to determine
its meaning in the Amendment;... afterexamining the dictionaries
in common use... wefind little to add to the succinct definition
adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Act of 1909.
'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor,
or from both combined,' provided it be understood to include profit
gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets."
In the Merchant's Loan and Trust Company v. Smietanka the
Court held that the word 'income' in the 16th Amendment included
a gain from a single isolated sale as well as profits from sales by one
engaged in buying and selling
issufficient to say of this contention, that no such distinction
was recognized in the Civil War Income Tax Act of 1867, c. 169,
14 Stat. 471, 478, or in the Act of 1894, c. 349, 28 Stat. 509, 553,
declared unconstitutional on an unrelated ground; that it was not
recognized in determining income under the Excise Tax Act of 1909,
as the cases cited, supra, show; that it is not to be found, in terms,
in any of the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Acts of
1913, 1916, 1917, or 1919; that the definition of the word 'income'
as used in the Sixteenth Amendment, which has been developed by
this Court, does not recognize any such distinction; that in depart-
mental practice, for now seven years, such a rule has not been
applied; and that there is no essential difference in the nature of the
transaction or in the relation of the profit to the capital involved,
whether the sale or conversion be a single, isolated transaction or
one of many. The interesting and ingenious argument, which is
earnestly pressed upon us, that this distinction is so fundamental and
obvious that it must be assumed to be a part of the 'general under-
standing' of the meaning of the word 'income' fails to convince us
17252U.S.189,4OSup.Ct. 189 (1920).
255U.S.509, 41Sup. Ct. 386 (1921).36 CHAPTER 2
that a construction should be adopted which would, in a large
measure, defeat the purpose of the Amendment.
In determining the definition of the word 'income' thus
arrived at, this court has consistently refused to enter into the
refinements of lexicographers or economists and has approved, in
the definitions quoted, what it believed to be the commonly under-
stood meaning of the term which must have been in the minds of
the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.
The British income tax decisions are interpretations of statutes
so wholly different in their wording from the acts of Congress which
we are considering that they are quite without value in arriving at
the construction of the laws here involved."
7 ACCRUED BUT UNREALIZED CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES EXCLUDED
FROM DETERMINATION OF TAXABLE INCOME
On the question whether an unrealized appreciation in the value of
an asset may be taxed as income the Supreme Court has consistently
ruled in the negative. In Towne v. Eisner a unanimous court declared
that Congress had not intended, when it passed the Revenue Act of
1913, to tax stock dividends as income.19 The 1916 Act specifically
included the cash value of stock dividends in taxable income. When
the Standard Oil Company of California distributed a 50 percent
stock dividend in 1916, charging the dividend against its accumu-
lated surplus account, one stockholder paid under protest a per-
sonal income tax on the part of the value of the dividend that
represented corporate profits accumulated after March 1, 1913, and
sued to recover the amount on the ground that the stock dividend
was not income. In a famous five to four decision in Eisner v. Ma-
comber (see note 17), the Supreme Court held on constitutional
grounds that income, to be taxable, must be realized, and that a
stock dividend is not a realization. The Court declared: "Neither
under the Sixteenth Amendment nor otherwise has Congress power
to tax without apportionment a true stock dividend made lawfully
and in good faith, or the accumulated profits behind it, as income
of the stockholder.
We are clear that not only does a stock dividend really take
nothing from the property of the corporation and add nothing to
that of the shareholder, but that the antecedent accumulation of
profits evidenced thereby, while indicating that the shareholder is
1b245U.S. 418, 38 Sup. Ct. 158 (1918).ORIGINS OF SPECIAL LEGAL STATUS 37
the richer because of an increase of his capital, at the same time
shows he has not realized or received any income in the transaction.
without selling, the shareholder, unless possessed of other
resources, has not the wherewithal to pay an income tax upon the
dividend stock. Nothing could more clearly show that to tax a
stock dividend is to tax a capital increase, and not income, than
this demonstration that in the nature of things it requires conversion
of capital in order to pay the tax.
Secondly, and more important for present purposes, enrich-
ment through increase in value of capital investment is not income
in any proper meaning of the term."
The Court made liberal use of italics to emphasize that to con-
stitute income the gain must be separated from the capital:
"Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capi-
tal, not a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain,
a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from the prop-
erty, severed from the capital however invested or employed, and
coming in, being derived, that is, received or drawn by the recipient
(the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal; —thatis
income derived from property."
As Professor Magill has pointed out, the decision does not explain
the Court's reasons for holding why a mere growth in the value of
an investment cannot be regarded as income; why a gain, to be
income, must be severed from capital (op. cit., p. 18). Professor
T. R. Powell, in an often-quoted comment upon this decision,
declared:
"Nothing in the nature of things makes separation from capital
one of the requisites of income from capital. From a practical corn-
monsense point of view, there is something strange in the idea that
a man may indefinitely grow richer without being subject to an
income tax."2°
In accordance with the Court's decision, Congress expressly pro-
vided in the Revenue Act of 1921 and in subsequent revenue acts
until 1936 that "a stock dividend shall not be subject to tax". The
Treasury interpreted this to mean that a corporation might issue
any class of its own stock as a dividend to its stockholders without
subjecting the latter to income tax on it.21Thecommon stock-
holders might receive a tax-free dividend of 6 percent preferred
Income from Corporate Dividends (1922), 35 Harvard Law Review, 363,
376.
21Articles 115-8,Treas.Reg. 86(1934).38 CHAPTER 2
stock, for example. But in 1936, in Koshland v. Helvering (298
U. S. 441, 56 Sup. Ct. 767), the Supreme Court declared: "where
a stock dividend gives the stockholder an interest different from
that which his former stock holdings represented, he receives in-
come," and "the latter type of dividend is taxable under the Sixteenth
Amendment". Congress promptly removed the blanket statutory
exemption it had apparently granted to stock dividends since the
Macomber decision of 1920, and replaced it with one reading:
"A distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders in
its stock or in rights to acquire its stock shall not be treated as a
dividend to the extent that it does not constitute income to the
shareholder within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to
the Constitution."
The Treasury Department soon brought a case before the
Supreme Court in which the issues decided in Eisner v. Macomber
might be reconsidered.22 The Court, however, on the ground that
Congress had not intended to tax the stock dividends in question,
refused to reconsider the Macomber decision. A minority of the
Court, nevertheless, was ready to do so. Speaking for the minority
of three justices, Mr. Justice Douglas declared (pp. 409-11):
"The wealth of stockholders normally increases as a result of the
earnings of the corporation in which they hold shares. I see no
reason why Congress could not treat that increase in wealth as
'income' to them....Thenotion that there can be no 'income' to
the shareholders in such a case within the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment unless the gain is 'severed from' capital and made
available to the recipient for his 'separate use, benefit and disposal'
•.. willnot stand analysis. .Thenarrow question here is whether
Congress has the power to 'make the receipt of a stock dividend
based on earnings an occasion for recognizing that accrual of wealth
for income tax purposes."
8 RATIONALE OF THE REALIZATION DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court's insistence that a capital gain must be realized
in order to be taxable as income is consistent with the traditional
judicial view that a taxpayer's capital investment consists of the
thing, the res, rather than its value, the land or factory building or
share of stock or bond, not its money cost or its market price. As
long as the gain is embodied in the same investment entity, the
taxpayer is said not to have anything more than he had before.
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When it is separated from this entity or when the investment is sold,
the gain constitutes taxable income. In holding that realized capital
gains are income, however, the Supreme Court has applied the res
conceptin less extreme form than the British. The latter have con-
tinued to regard realized, like unrealized gains, as mere 'accretions
to capital': what the seller receives is oniy the money value of the
investment entity he possessed before; the entire proceeds of the
sale merely replaces the capital investment he gives up.
As we have observed, the resconceptwas convenient in an
agricultural economy with only rudimentary accounting practices.
Under present conditions it is much less so. A landed estate could
orice be presumed to last forever. But much of present-day capital
equipment has a relatively short life. To determine net income now
requires pecuniary appraisals of the amounts of capital value used
up through the depreciation and obsolescence of assets, even when
the latter retain the same physical dimensions as before. Stocks and
bonds now form a major part of private property, and these are
passed frequently from hand to hand by transient owners, quite
unlike the landed estates of postfeudal England. Their market value
is often their most significant aspect for the investor. A rise in their
value gives him the same addition to his command over economic
goods and services as an equal addition to his savings from other
sources; a fall, the same decrease.
For these reasons, outside the courts, the physical aspects of
capital and income have receded into the background and the
pecuniary or value aspects have assumed predominance. A man's
capital today tends to be regarded as a quantity of pecuniary value
that may be shifted from one investment to another. And because
the investment is viewed as a quantity of value, not as a thing or
series of things, the ancient judicial distinction between income and
an 'accretion to capital' now sounds archaic to laymen and is not
always intelligible to them. The resconceptof capital gives rise to
such anomalies in England as the nonallowance of depreciation in
the determination of taxable income from buildings other than
factories, and the nonrecognition of deductions for depletion. In
the modified form in which the concept has been applied in the
United States such anomalies are greatly reduced. But the require-
ment that gains must be 'realized' to be taxable frequently produces
highly unequal tax treatment as between individuals who realize and
those who do not realize their gains. For example, a man whose
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lion during his lifetime may leave his fortune to his children without
ever paying an income tax on the amount of the increase by merely
not selling the stock or trading it in a taxable exchange. (Of course
he will have been subject to income tax on any cash dividends and
certain stock dividends he may have received.)
In accordance with the value concept of a capital investment,
some economists contend that income in the sense of a man's
capacity to contribute to the support of government properly
includes both the amount of his consumption expenditures and all
net additions to the value of his property during a given period.
R. M. Haig's definition, "Income is the money value of the net
accretion to one's economic power between two points of time" is
of this character.23 So is Henry Simons' view: "Personal income
may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value
of the store of property rights between the beginning and the end
of the period in question."24 Georg Schanz proposed a similar view
in Germany in 1896.25
Nevertheless, no one can contend that the popular conception of
income includes unrealized or 'paper' profits and losses. The income
tax statute depends for its successful administration upon the co-
operation of millions of individual and corporate taxpayers, each
of whom is responsible for making out his tax return. The legal
concept of income should therefore approximate that of the inteffi-
gent layman. Even if the popular conception were altered through
education and experience to include unrealized gains and losses, the
difficulties of administering a concept of income that required an
appraisal of every taxpayer's assets each year would be forbidding.
The liquidation of capital assets is often costly, and the market value
of a small amount of a given asset, say 100 shares of X Company
common stock, is sometimes not a reliable measure of the price
that could be obtained if a much larger amount had to be sold. For
these and other reasons, the valuations would in many cases have to
be conjectural and therefore subject to dispute; and the accounting
and auditing requirements of both taxpayers and tax enforcement
officials would be multiplied.
The Concept of Income, The Federal income Tax (Columbia University
Press, 1926), Ch. 1.
Personalincome Taxation (University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 50.
Der Einkommenbegriff und die Einkommensteuergesetze, Finanz Archiv,
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Nor is the popular conception without merit. Changes in the
market values of capital assets are often transitory. To take account
of all changes might entail much burdensome bookkeeping with
little net result. Even when a rise in value appears to be more last-
ing, the taxpayer who does not sell might be gravely inconvenienced
or injured if he had to pay a tax on his imputed gain under the
jncome tax in the year in which it arises. To sell a portion of his
asset to raise funds to pay the tax might be impractical or unduly
costly. In short, we might wholly agree with the general validity
of the position taken by Haig, Simons, Schanz, and some others,
but still hold that the appropriate and convenient time to take
account of changes in the value of a man's property is when he
realizes the gains or losses.
What constitutes 'realization', however, is a critical question. If
only sales for cash were deemed to occasion realization for tax
purposes, the door would be opened wide for avoiding taxes on
capital gains. Since many if not most sellers of capital assets sooner
or later reinvest rather than consume the proceeds, they could con-
trive, possibly with the aid of third parties, to have their sales take
the form of exchanges of some types of capital assets for others.
A man might exchange a parcel of real estate for marketable securi-
ties having a value several times the cost of the real estate to him,
without technically realizing a gain. If an investor wanted to take
his profits in General Motors common stock and to shift his funds
to Bethlehem Steel common, he might have a broker arrange an
exchange, instead of a sale and purchase, and so avoid realizing a
taxable gain. Or a corporation might distribute its accumulated
profits as dividends consisting of marketable shares of preferred and
common stocks in subsidiary or affiliated or even unrelated cor-
porations, without making its stockholders liable to income taxes
on the distributions.
But the Supreme Court, by a broad construction of 'realization',
removed most of these possibilities of avoiding income taxes on
capital gains. In Peabody v. Eisner it held that the gain need not
be realized in money but might occur in connection with the receipt
of property having an exchangeable value.26 Exchanges of property,
no less than sales, may give rise to taxable gains. The Court's rul-
ings in 1920, that the receipt of a stock dividend in the Macomber
case did not constitute taxable income to the stockholder even
though the dividend represented accumulated profits, has been of
U.S. 347,38 Sup. Ct. 546(1918).42 CHAPTER 2
much narrower application than was at first supposed. In a series
of leading cases concerning new securities received by stockholders
in connection with corporate reorganizations, decided between 1921
and 1925,27 it held that the stockholders realized taxable income
when they received securities differing in kind or extent from their
previous holdings.28 When a gain previously accrued was realized
by being separated from the investment, it was held to be taxable
income even if the value of the investment declined by an amount
corresponding to the gain. This was the situation of the stockholders
of the Prairie Oil and Gas Company who were held to be liable
for income tax on the value of the stock they received in a new pipe-
line company the parent company created to separate its pipeline
business from its oil and gas operations.2° In short, the realization
doctrine has often functioned in practice not so much to deny that
unrealized gains are truly gains as to determine the appropriate
time or occasion for taking account of them for tax purposes. The
chief exceptions are that transfers of property at death or by inter
vivos gifts are not regarded as occasioning realization of capital
gains or losses.
9 CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS AND THE REALIZATION DOCTRINE
Even the realization doctrine, as applied by the Court, led to the
creation of income tax liabilities sooner, in many instances, than
Congress deemed wise or appropriate. These instances occurred
mainly in connection with corporate mergers, consolidations, re-
capitalizations, and reorganizations. The stock- and bondholders of
corporations participating in such readjustments commonly received
new securities in exchange for their old ones. Before the Revenue
Act of 1921 such exchanges were in some cases held to be the
equivalent of sales, requiring the participants to report as a realized
gain or loss any difference in value between the securities received
and the cost or other basis of the securities surrendered.
Two objections were forcefully voiced against recognizing gain
or loss for tax purposes on exchanges of this character. First, many
U.S. v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156,42 Sup. Ct. 63 (1921); Rockefeller v. U.S.,
257 U. S. 176, 42 Sup. Ct. 68 (1921); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U. S. 134,
43 Sup. Ct. 495 (1923); Weiss v.Stearn, 265 U. S. 242,44Sup.Ct.490 (1924);
and Marr v. U.s., 268 U.S. 536,45 Sup.Ct.575 (1925). See Magiil, op. cit.,
for a brief account of these cases.
James Parker Hall, Exchange of Securities in Corporate Reorganization as
Income, 20 Illinois Law Review 601 (1926).
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corporate readjustments that involve the issuance of new securities
for old do not interrupt the continuity of the taxpayer's investment
or alter its essential character. The investor does not receive any
money; the new securities merely replace the old ones. To require
him to pay a tax on the paper profit imputed in such a transaction
may force him to sell a portion of the securities and to make the
sale at an unfavorable time as well. He is in essentially the same
position as an investor with an unrealized gain.
Second, when all or many such exchanges are treated as occa-
sioning a realization of gain or loss, corporate officials and securities
owners hesitate to make various normal and useful readjustments
in capital structures and intercorporate relations for fear of incur-
ring immediate tax liabilities. During the Congressional hearings
on the Revenue Act of 1921 it was contended that many corporate
reorganizations the depression of 1920-21 had made desirable were
being impeded by this fear.8°
In response to these considerations, Congress specified in the Rev-
enue Act of 1921 that no gain or loss shall be recognized in connec-
tion with certain classes of exchanges even if the property received
in exchange has a realizable market value. The aim was not perma-
nently to exclude these gains and losses from the income tax but
to postpone recognition until a more appropriate occasion, i.e.,
sale. Wide openings for tax avoidance through the so-called re-
organization provisions were soon discovered, however. Successive
attempts to close the loopholes were made in the Revenue Acts of
1923, 1924, 1926, 1928, 1932, 1934 and, in minor ways, since.
Under present law, which in the main embodies the elaborately
contrived revisions enacted in 1934, 6 kinds of reorganization are
defined in connection with which exchanges of property may take
place without the recognition of gain or loss:
1) A statutory merger or consolidation by which one corporation
absorbs another, or two or more corporations unite to form a new
one.
2) The acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all
or a part of its voting stock, of at least 80 percent of the voting stock
and at least 80 percent of all other classes of stock of another cor-
poration.
3) The acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all
See Hearings on Revenue Revision, Ways and Means Committee, 66th
Cong., 3d Sess.; Report of the Ways and Means Committee, 67th Cong., 1st
Sess. (House Report 350); Seidman, op. cit., p. 790.44 CHAPTER 2
or a part of its voting stock, of substantially all the properties of
another corporation.
4) A transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another
corporation if, immediately after the transfer, the transferor or its
shareholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the
assets are transferred.
5) A recapitalization.
6) A mere change in identity, form, or place of organization.
In addition, the Internal Revenue Code, Section 112 (b) (5) speci-
ties: "No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred
to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock
or securities in such corporation, and immediately after the ex-
change such person or persons are in control of the corporation;
but in the case of an exchange by two or more persons this para-
graph shall apply only if the amount of stock or securities received
by each is substantially in proportion to his interest in the property
prior to the exchange. ..." (Controlis defined as ownership of stock
possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock.)
In seeking to confine the taxpayer's advantage from the nonrecog-
nition provisions to postponement of, rather than exemption from,
tax liability, Section 113 (a) (6), requires him to measure the gain
on any subsequent sale of the property he receives by a basis deter-
mined by the original cost of the property given for it, minus any
money received and plus any gain recognized. When a corporation
issues its own stock as a consideration for property, the basis of the
property acquired is the cost to the transferor, increased by the
amount of any gain or decreased by the amount of any loss recog-
nized by the latter in the transfer (Sec. 113 (a) (7) ).Inthese ways,
the law endeavors to take account eventually of the appreciation or
depreciation occurring up to the time a piece of property is trans-
ferred in a tax-free exchange.
Specific as the reorganization provisions appear to have become,
they still leave considerable room for judicial interpretation. The
question of the distinction between an outright sale and a reorgan-
ization has arisen repeatedly. In Pinellas Ice and Coal Storage Com-
pany v. Commissioner, 287 U. S. 469 (1933), the assets of two
companies were transferred to another company for cash and short
term notes. The Court held that this was not a reorganization,
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veryeasy". In a series of decisions the Court appears to have arrived
at the broad rule that, as respects the consideration received in what
purports to be a tax-free reorganization rather than a sale, "common
and preferred stock in sufficient proportion passes the test, while
bonds do not".3' The Court has indicated that a continuity of pro-
prietary interest in the reorganized company must be maintained by
the shareholders in the predecessor company.32 It has excluded vari-
ous tax-avoidance schemes by requiring that the exchange of assets
by one corporation with another in a tax-free reorganization must
have a business purpose, not merely the purpose of avoiding taxes.38
It has held that the earnings of the predecessor companies partici-
pating in a tax-free reorganization are the earnings of the successor
too, and therefore constitute taxable dividends when distributed to
the shareholders. It thus prevented the use of reorganizations for
the purpose of effecting tax-free distributions of accumulated cor-
porate earnings. In all these respects it has generally insisted that the
spirit as well as the letter of the law be observed. To be tax-free the
exchanges must be "required by business exigencies" and must
"effect only a readjustment of continuing interest in property under
modified corporate forms".34 The consequence has been to narrow
the opportunities for tax-avoidance. Taking its language in part
from the decisions of the Court, Congress amended the Internal
Revenue Code in 1943 (Sec. 129) to provide that persons who
obtained control of a corporation on or after October 8, 1940 and
corporations that acquired the property of others the basis of which
is also transferred, for the principal purpose of evading or avoiding
income or excess profit taxes, are denied the deductions, credits, or
other allowances requisite to attaining that end.
10 CONGRESS POSSESSES WIDE LATITUDE IN THE TAXTREATMENT
OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
In the light of these judicial decisions, Congress possesses wide con-
stitutional powers respecting the tax treatment of capital gains and
losses. It may tax realized capital gains in full as ordinary income,
as it did under the income tax laws of 1913 through 1920. It may
subject them to lower rates of tax or exempt varying proportions,
Randolph E. Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation, 3d Series (Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1940), p. 104.
ibid., pp. 104-2 1, and Magill, op. cit., pp. 153-62.
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935); andLeav. Commissioner, 96
F (2nd) 55 (1938).
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as it has done in one fashion or another at different times since 1921.
There is no reason to believe that it lacks the power to exempt them
altogether from ordinary income taxes. Its power to allow or to dis-
allow deductions for losses to any extent it deems desirable is beyond
dispute. Only the power to tax unrealized gains has been denied by
the Supreme Court. Even here, there is a strong possibility that the
Court might uphold at least the optional inventorying of securities
and other capital assets on the basis of market value, if Congress saw
fit to extend this privilege. Dealers in securities are at present per-
mitted to inventory their holdings on the basis of market value if
they choose. (Ordinary business concerns are usually required to
account for their inventories on the basis of cost, or the lower of
cost or market value, or on a 'last-in first-out' If the law
so permitted, the investor who elected to inventory his securities
on a market value basis would, in effect, acquire the right to deduc-
tions for unrealized capital losses in exchange for agreeing to subject
his unrealized profits to taxation. In the opinion of Professor Magill,
the decision of the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Independent Life
Insurance Company indicates that an optional provision of this kind
would be valid.36
That the Court would uphold the compulsory inventorying of
capital assets on a market value basis as a part of a general method
of accounting and reporting for income tax purposes is doubtful,
though not inconceivable. Although the issue is by no means clear,
Professor Magill has pointed to several recent decisions indicating
that such a plan might be upheld.37 Whether Congress could con-
stitutionally treat as income unrealized capital gains embodied in
property transferred by inter vivos gift or at death is a major unset-
tled question.
Within these relatively moderate constitutional barriers Congres-
sional policy is free to respond, in framing the tax treatment of
capital gains and losses, to considerations of equity, economic effects,
and administrative convenience. In beginning our discussion of these
considerations, we turn first to the economic nature and sources of
capital gains and losses.
Reg. 111,Sec. 29.22,(c)-5and (c)-2;Sec. 22 (d).
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